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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
-vs- Case No. 16609 
RODNEY K. STARKS, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
The appellant was charged with Criminal Homicide, 
Murder in the Second Degree, in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-5-203 (1953), as amended. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Appellant was tried before a jury and found guilty 
of Criminal Homicide, Manslaughter, a lesser included offense, 
on June 27, 1979, in the Third Judicial District Court, the 
Honorable Ernest F. Baldwin, Jr., presiding. The trial court 
sentenced appellant to an indeterminate term of one to fifteen 
years in the Utah State Prison. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks an order of this Court affirming 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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the judgment of the jury at trial and the sentence of the 
trial court. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On the evening of September 29, 1978, appellant 
Rodney K. Starks arranged with Kaylene Griggs to have her 
permanent wave his hair (R. 159). Starks had become friends 
with Ms. Griggs when they worked together at Kim's Massage 
Parlor (R. 15 7) . Starks agreed to pick up Ms. Griggs after 
she completed her shift as a dancer at the Golden Fleece Bar 
I located in the area of 250 West and 3300 South (R. 160). Whe: 
appellant arrived at the bar he called Kaylene from a telepho: 
in the Touch of Class Massage Parlor located on the lower fk 
of the same building (R. 159). Ms. Griggs testified that she 
I 
told appellant that Joe Boykin, her ex-boyfriend, was in the 
bar bothering her and asked Starks if he would come upsUin 1 
to wait by the door for her (R. 160). When Starks left the 
bar with Ms. Griggs, Boykin followed them outside into the 
parking lot (R. 161) and over to a vehicle Starks had borrowe; 
from his employer Al Cortez (R. 163). 
As Ms. Griggs was seated in the car with the passW 
door open, Boykin grabbed her arm, removed her from the car, 
st·· I 
and pulled his fist back as if he were going to hit her. ' 
pushed Boykin away and attempted to calm him (R. 165-166) · ''' 
Griggs testified that Starks told Boykin "if he wanted to :c-
1 
-2-
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to [her) to talk to [her) on his own time, that right now 
[she) was on his time . . " (R. 166). When Boykin asked 
if Starks was Ms. Grigg~ "old man," he told Boykin that he 
was not and added, "[I)f I was I would treat her alot better 
than you have." (R. 166). As Ms. Griggs turned her back on 
Starks and Boykin to place her personal articles in the car, 
she heard a shot (R. 167). When she turned back, both men 
were running toward the end of the parking lot (R. 167). 
Ms. Griggs returned to the bar and called the police (R. 169). 
During the interval before the shooting, Peter 
Isaacson, owner of the Touch of Class Massage Parlor, arrived 
in the parking lot (R. 240). Isaacson testified that it was 
growing dark when he arrived, and Boykin, Ms. Griggs and Starks 
were standing near the passenger side of Al Cortez' car (R. 241). 
Isaacson walked over to the car to say hello, whereupon Boykin 
became upset with him (R. 242-244). Appellant told Isaacson 
it would be best if he left (R. 244). Isaacson walked away, 
but turned and looked back toward the car before he reached 
the building (R. 245). He then say Boykin grab Ms. Griggs' 
arm and saw Starks remove Boykin's hand (R. 245-246). He 
testified that Boykin backed off as if he wanted to fight (R. 247). 
He heard shots as appellant and Boykin stood seven to eight 
feet apart facing each other (R. 247-249). Isaacson saw both 
men run toward the street with Boykin running ahead of Starks, 
-3-
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and he heard three more shots (R. 250). Isaacson follow~ 
Starks and Boykin up 3300 South toward the railroad tracks 
where he saw Boykin fall (R. 252). Starks returned to the 
car then began walking north of 3300 South (R. 253). 
I 
When Officer Vaughn of the Salt Lake County Sheriff 
1 
Department arrived at the scene, the victim was lying in the • 
middle of 3300 South about 400 yards from the Golden Fleece 
Bar (R. 141). Boykin subsequently died from multiple gunshoti 
wounds. Dr. Serge Moore of the State Medical Examiner's Off:: 
testified that the ultimate cause of death was a gunshot whit 
entered the left thigh and severed the femoral artery which 
carries blood to the legs (R. 207). 
In support of appellant's claim that he shot Boykir. 
in self-defense, appellant's counsel introduced evidence 
illustrating the violent propensities of the victim. On cro:o 
examination, Kaylene Griggs testified that one evening while 
she was having dinner with Starks and Al Cortez, Boykin enten 
the restaurant and asked her to step outside where he assault: 
her (R. 174-175). She also testified that she told appellant 
about an incident when Boykin pretended to have a gun in his 
pocket to frighten two men (R. 178), and also told him that 
Boykin had raped her (R. 176). 
Appellant testified that his contacts with the 
d · B k' y from Kim's deceased generally involve keeping oy in awa 
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Massage Parlor (R. 296). Starks further testified about the 
incident in the restaurant (R. 297) and acknowledged that Ms. 
Griggs told him about the alleged rape (R. 303-304) and the 
incident in which Boykin pretended to have a gun (R. 304). 
Starks admitted that when he pulled into the parking lot of 
the Golden Fleece bar, he recognized Boykin's car, removed a 
pistol which he was aware was under the seat of Al Cortez' 
automobile and placed it in his pocket (R. 311-312). Appellant 
said he knew the gun was loaded but was not certain how to 
operate it (R. 312). Starks claimed to have shot Boykin 
because he believed he was reaching into his pocket for a 
gun (R. 323-325) and that he continued to shoot to assure the 
deceased would not return to the parking lot (R. 328). 
At the trial, the jury was instructed in the elements 
of Second Degree Murder (R. 87), Manslaughter (R. 89-90), 
and self-defense (R. 94-96). Appellant requested an instruction 
directing the jury to consider evidence of the deceased's 
character (R. 72) and requested an instruction on reasonable 
alternative hypothesis (R. 52-53). Both requests were denied. 
POINT I 
THE INSTRUCTION ON THE LIMITATION OF 
SELF-DEFENSE TO NON-AGRESSORS WAS 
PROPERLY SUBMITTED TO THE JURY. 
The trial court instructed the jury in the present 
case as to the elements of criminal homicide, instruction 
-5-
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number 14 (R. 86) , second degree murder, instruction number 1 
15 (R. 87), and the lesser included offense of Manslaughter 
'I 
instruction numbers 17, 18 and 19 (R. 89, 90, 91). The jury 
was further instructed as to the requisite intent necessary ' 
to be guilty of the above-noted offenses in instruction nurnbe:i 
16 (R. 88), and the appellant's 
explained in instruction numbers 
theory of self-defense was i 
I 
22, 23 and 24 (R. 94, 95, 1! 
I 
I As a part of its instructions on self-defense, the Court guw 
! 
portions of Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-402 (1953), as amended. 
Instruction number 22 reads: 
1. A person is justified in threatening 
or using force against another when and to 
the extent that he reasonably believes that 
such force is necessary to defend himself 
or a third person against such other's 
imminent use of unlawful force; however, a 
person is justified in using force which is 
intended or likely to cause death or serious 
bodily injury only if he reasonably believes 
that the force is necessary to prevent death 
or serious bodily injury to himself or a 
third person, or to prevent the commission 
of a forcible felony. 
2. A person is not justified in using force 
under the circumstances specified in para-
graph one of this section if he: 
(a) Was the aggressor or was engaged 
in a combat by agreement, unless he 
withdraws from the encounter and effec-
tively communicates to such other pers?n 
his intent to do so and the other notw1~h­
standing continues or threatens to conti~e 
the use of unlawful force. 
Appellant contends that it was prejudicial error: 
-6-
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include the language in section 2(a) of the above instruction, 
claiming that there was no evidence to support submission of 
this instruction on the limitation of self-defense to non-
aggressors. Respondent submits that there was substantial 
evidence to support submission of this instruction and, in 
the alternative, even if the language relating to agression 
had been inapplicable, there was no error in framing this 
instruction in the statutory language. 
This Court has previously approved the practice of 
giving jury instructions substantially equivalent to the 
statutory language. See: State v. Schoenfeld, 545 P.2d 193 
(Utah 1976) (self-defense instruction substantially in the 
language of Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-402 (1953), is proper), 
and State v. Hughes, 24 Utah 2d 235, 469 P.2d 235 (1970) 
(voluntary manslaughter instructions substantially in the 
language of the statute are proper). Cf: State v. Murphy, 27 
Utah 2d 98, 493 P.2d 617 (1972) (instruction in form of 
statute is permissible), and State v. Gallegos, 16 Utah 2d 
102, 396 P.2d 414 (1964) (giving instructions in the words of 
the statute is not erroneous). 
The standard given by this Court for determining 
whether statutory language is appropriate for jury instructions 
is whether the instruction " is supported by a reasonable 
interpretation of the evidence." State v. Minnish, 560 P.2d 
-7-
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340, 341 (Utah 1977). In the present case there was ample 
evidence to give rise to a jury question whether appellant 
was an aggressor, and the instruction was thus proper. 
Appellant cites the definition of "aggressor" 
approved by this Court in State v. Schoenfeld, 545 P.2d 19J 
(Utah 1976), contending that the facts of the present case 
do not satisfy that definition. The trial court in that 
case instructed the jury that, 
An aggressor is one who willingly and 
knowingly initially provokes a combat 
or does acts of such a nature as would 
ordinarily lead to combat. A person can 
also be classified as an aggressor if he 
leaves the scene of a quarrel, arms him-
self and then returns to the scene and 
renews the quarrel. 
545 P.2d at 196. (Emphasis added.) 
Applying this definition to the facts of the prese: 
case, there is sufficient evidence to support submission of 
the instruction on aggression to the jury. Several incident 
testified to at trial indicate that appellant did "acts of 
such a nature as would ordinarily lead to combat." The evi· 
dence established that appellant had notice of the violent 
character of Boykin. Appellant's knowledge was testified tc 
by Ms. Griggs (R. 174-176, 178) and appellant himself (R.l~ 
300, 303, 304). When appellant arrived at the Golden fleece 
Bar, he noticed Boykin' s car in the parking lot and armed 
himself for a possible confrontation (R. 311-312). He adn: 
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I 
I 
I 
that rather than taking action to avoid the confrontation, 
he "marched" into the Golden Fleece Bar "like a man. 11 (R. 
335-336). Appellant clearly expected and was prepared for 
a confrontation and took no steps to avoid it. Finally, 
the discussion which took place shortly before the shooting 
clearly shows that appellant was the aggressor. Rather than 
acting as the peace-maker depicted in appellant's statement 
of facts (Appellant's Brief p.5), Starks made statements to 
Boykin which clearly added to the conflict. Ms. Griggs 
testified to the following conversation between the appellant 
and Boykin which took place shortly before the shooting: 
Sammy told him that I didn't want to 
talk to him and if he wanted to talk 
to me to talk to me on his own time 
that right now, I was on his time and 
Joe said well, is this your old man, 
now, and Sammy said, no, I am not her 
old man but, if I was I would treat 
her a lot better than you have. (R. 166). 
During cross-examination, the appellant admitted that 
while he could not remember the exact nature of this conversation, 
he had tried "to sound confident ... because [he) didn't 
want to sound weak or scared ... 11 (R. 336). Clearly, the 
conversation was not as conciliatory as the appellant would 
have this Court believe, and Starks' statements to the deceased 
clearly fall within the definition of "acts of a nature which 
would ordinarily lead to combat" under the circumstances of 
this case. 
-9-
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Under the test delineated by this court in ~ 
v. Minnish, supra, the issue of whether appellant was an 
aggressor in the confrontation with the deceased was proper!: 
submitted to the jury since the disputed instruction was 
clearly "supported by a reasonable interpretation of the ev'.· 
dence." 560 P.2d at 341. Similarly, submission of the 
instruction on aggression was proper under the principles 
noted in State v. Turner, 79 P.2d 46 (Utah 1938), cited~ 
appellant. Although concluding that the evidence did not 
support a finding that the deceased attacked the appellant, 
this court observed that it should be left to the jury to 
determine whether or not the defendant was the aggressor. 
This court stated: 
. it was pre-eminently a jury 
question whether, under the circum-
stances, [the deceased's] conduct 
was sufficiently menacing to create 
in the mind of the defendant as a 
reasonable man an honest belief that 
the danger to him was imminent and 
that his action in shooting was 
honestly to protect himself from 
loss of life or great bodily harm. 
79 P.2d at 52. 
Similarly, it was a jury question in the present case whethe: 
appellant was the aggressor in the confrontation. 
Even if the language dealing with the limitation: 
were shown to be inapplicabl' 
self-defense to non-aggressors 
· t · was r,·· 
in the present case, submission of this instruc ion 
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prejudicial error. This court reviewed a situation where 
portions of statutory language in a self-defense instruction 
were inapplicable in the case of State v. Schoenfeld, 545 
P.2d 193 (Utah 1976). In that case the defendant, who was 
convicted of negligent homicide, assigned as error the trial 
court's instruction, in the language of Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-402 
(1953), as amended, that one who "is committing, or is fleeing 
after the commission or attempted commission of a felony" 
may not claim self-defense. 545 P.2d at 196. Appellant's 
claim of error was based upon the fact that his conduct 
toward the deceased would not have necessarily constituted 
a felony, but may have been a misdemeanor only. In response, 
this Court stated: 
The instructions are stated in abstract 
generality; and they do not purport to 
tell the jury either what the evidence 
is or what the facts are . . . 
[T]his paragraph is stating an exception: 
that is, when "a person is not justified 
in using force." This telling the jury 
that a person in defendant's circumstances 
is deprived of that defense if he is 
attempting to commit a felony has the 
effect of saying that defendant would not 
be deprived of the defense unless his 
conduct was an offense of the higher 
order; i.e. a felony, but would leave 
him with the defense if his conduct were 
only a misdemeanor. . ~t should.be 
obvious that requiring the Jury to find 
his conduct to be of the higher order 
before depriving him of self-defense could 
not have been prejudicial to the defendant 
under the circumstances. 
545 P.2d at 197. 
-11-
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Clearly, even if there had been no evidence~~ 
the appellant acted as an aggressor in the present case, 
there would be no prejudicial error in an instruction which 
merely stated an exception requiring the jury to find evi-
dence of aggression to deny appellant's claimed defense. 
Furthermore, the jury was specifically instructed that, "If 
an instruction applies only to a state of facts which you 
find does not exist, you will disregard the instruction." 
(R. 100) Such an instruction is necessary whenever the 
evidence at trial is susceptible to several interpretations. 
In the present case, the jury was instructed~ 
the elements of Second Degree Murder, Manslaughter and 
Homicide justified as self-defense. Accordingly, the 
applicability of individual instructions depended upon the 
determination of facts by the jury. In this case the fact 
that an instruction would not apply to a particular factual 
determination would clearly not constitute prejudicial error 
Appellant cites numerous cases from neighboring 
jurisdictions involving factual situations where instructior' 
on the limitation of self-defense to non-aggressors have 
been found either applicable or inapplicable by the courts. 
; I 
Respondent submits that these cases all stand for the gener,. 
principle that there must be sufficient evidence to support 
the legal theory behind an instruction before it is su~iW 
to the jury. 
-12-
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Jury instructions should not be construed as 
comments upon the evidence for the sake of claiming error 
in their admission. State v. Schoenfeld, 545 P.2d 193, 
197 (Utah 1976). The disputed instruction in the present 
case was properly submitted to the jury as reflecting one 
possible interpretation of the evidence which the jury chose 
to accept in returning a verdict of Manslaughter. However, 
even if the instruction were found to be inapplicable, 
submission of this instruction would not be reversible error. 
-13-
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POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY REFUSED 
APPELLANT'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTION CON-
CERNING VIOLENT ACTS OF THE 
DECEASED. 
At trial, evidence of the violent propensities 
of the victim, and appellant's knowledge of past violent 
acts of the deceased was admitted in support of appel-
lant' s claim he acted in self-defense. This is in accord 
with the general rule that when a defendant claims to have 
acted in self-defense, evidence of the deceased's char-
acter may be admitted for purpose of assessing the reason- 1 
I 
ableness of the defendant's apprehension of imminent 
bodily harm. State v. Minnish, 560 P.2d 340 (Utah 1977). 
In the present case, appellant contends the trial court 
erred in refusing his proposed instruction which provided: 
You are instructed that all evidence 
known to RODNEY K. STARKS, on 
September 29, 1978, concerning the re-
putation and specific acts of viol-
ence and aggressiveness of Joseph 
L. Boykin is relevant to your de-
termination of Rodney K. Starks' 
state of mind and the reasonableness 
of his conduct at the time of this 
incident. 
On the basis of this evidence, con-
sidered in conjunction with the 
rest of the evidence in this case, if 
you find that there is a reasonable 
doubt that Rodney K. Starks committed 
the offense, then you must find Rodney 
K. Starks not guilty. (R. 72) 
-14-
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Respondent claims that there was no error in denying this 
instruction since the instructions actually given the jury 
were an adequate depiction of the defense of self-defense 
and clearly allowed the jury to consider the character of 
the deceased in assessing appellant's claim. 
The trial court gave four separate jury instruc-
tions on aspects of appellant's self-defense claim. 
Instruction number 22, discussed under the preceding 
point, included the statutory provisions of self-defense 
delineated by Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-402 (1953), as 
amended. (R. 94) Instruction number 23 stated that the 
defendant claiming self-defense is required to present 
some substantial evidence which would raise a reasonable 
doubt as to the defendant's guilt or whether or not de-
fendant acted in self-defense. (R. 95) Finally, the trial 
court's instruction number 25 particularly bears upon ap-
pellant's second claim of error. This instruction reads, 
in part: 
You are instructed that actual danger 
is not necessary to establish self-
defense. If one is confronted by 
the appearance of peril which arouses 
in his mind, as a reasonable person, 
an honest conviction that he is about 
to suffer death or serious bodily 
injury and if a reasonable person in a 
like situation, seeing and knowing the 
same facts, would be justified in 
-15-
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believing himself in danger, his right 
to self defense is the same whether 
such danger is real or merely 
apparent. 
(Emphasis added.) (R. 97) 
This instruction requested the jury to judge ap-
pellant's belief that he would suffer death or serious 
bodily injury at the hands of Joe Boykin from appellant's 
perspective, "seeing and knowing the same facts." These 
facts included appellant's knowledge of Boykin• s character 
and prior violent acts. Therefore, the jury was instru~ 
ted to consider the reasonableness of appellant's appre-
hension given his knowledge of the deceased' s character. 
Once the trial court had correctly instructed 
the jury in the law applicable to self-defense, refusal to 
give the defendant's requested instruction was not error. 
People v. Callaghan, 4 Utah 49, 6 P. 49 ( 1885). Respond-
ent submits that the instructions given by the trial court 
correctly and completely covered the area of self-defense. 
The jury was charged in clear and concise language that 
they were to evaluate appellant's actions from the 
standpoint of a reasonable man in appellant's position a~c 
possessing appellant's knowledge. Furthermore, the~~ 
posed instructions, if given, could have encouraged the 
jury to lose sight of the fact that it is the threat of 
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imminent death or bodily harm which determines whether 
self-defense is available and appellant would not be 
justified in using deadly force simply based upon his past 
experience or encounters with the deceased. 
Appellant again cites several cases from other 
jurisdictions in support of his contention that his re-
quested instruction should have been given to the jury. 
Respondent submits that the court's refusal to give the 
instruction was consistent with principles announced in 
those cases. 
Appellant cites the case of State v. Bush, 148 
Cal. Rptr. 430 (1978) in support of the contention that 
failure to give a specific instruction dealing with evi-
dence of the deceased's violent character is reversible 
error. However, in the Bush case, the trial court's 
instructions were found to unduly emphasize the fear of 
"imminent" or "present" danger, leading the appellate 
court to conclude the jury may have been diverted from 
adequately considering the evidence of prior threats made 
by the deceased to the defendant. In contrast, the jury 
instructions in the present case charged the jury unequiv-
ocally to judge the reasonableness of the appellant's 
self-defense claims from the standpoint of "a reasonable 
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person in a like situation, seeing and knowing the same 
facts." In addition, the jury was cautioned that even if 
it should later "appear that there was no actual danger~ 
there was only slight actual danger, that fact would not 
affect the right of self-defense if the appearances es~~ 
lishing that right existed." 
Second, appellant relies upon the Oklahoma case: 
of Rice v. State, 567 P.2d 525 (Okla. 1977), and Ramseyv. 
State, 558 P.2d 1179 (Okla. 1977). In Rice v. State, the 
court stated that where the instructions given at trial 
"fairly and accurately state the law they will be deemed 
sufficient." 558 P.2d at 530. Thus, the court found no 
error in refusing the defendant's requested instructioo 
when its substance was contained in instructions actually 
given. In the Ramsey case, the court added that the 
admission of evidence of prior threats "does not in and oi 
itself necessitate a special instruction," concluding that 
the jury would have no difficulty in applying the general 
self-defense instructions given by the court to the facts 
of the case. 558 P.2d at 1183. Thus, the Oklahomapos1· 
tion is that failure to give an instruction on considera· 
tion of the deceased' s character is not error where the 
instructions given fairly and accurately state the law. 
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Similarly, the North Carolina cases of State v. 
Hall, 228 S.E.2d 637 (1976), and State v. Rummage, 185 
S.E.2d 221 (1971), cited by appellant support general 
principles applicable to the present case. While the 
court in State v. Hall found it was error to omit instruc-
tions corelating evidence that the deceased was a violent 
man, the court cited the earlier case of State v. Rummage 
in support of the proposition that this error alone would 
not call for reversal. In a passage from the Rummage 
opinion quoted in State v. Hall, the North Carolina Court 
of Appeals stated: 
[We] are reluctant to hold that this 
error, standing alone, constituted re-
versible error, since the trial judge 
had otherwise fully charged on self-
defense. 
185 S.E. at 224. Thus even in a jurisdiction where 
failure to give an instruction concerning the deceased's 
character has been found to be error, it has not con-
stituted reversible error standing alone. 
The instructions on self-defense given in the 
present case embody the substance of Utah law. Therefore, 
there was no error in refusing to give appellant's re-
quested instruction. Furthermore, instruction number 25 
(R.97), discussed at length above, charged the jury that 
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they were to consider appellant's claim from the viewpoint 
of one "seeing and knowing the same facts." This instruc-
tion clearly allowed the jury to consider appellant's 
knowledge of Boykin's violent tendencies. Accordingly, 
there was no error in denying appellant's requested 
instruction since its substance was included in the self-
defense instructions actually given. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT WAS CORRECT IN REFUS-
ING TO INSTRUCT ON REASONABLE ALTERNA-
TIVE HYPOTHESIS. 
At trial, the appellant requested that the jury 
be given the following instruction on reasonable altern~ 
tive hypothesis: 
To warrant you in convicting the de-
fendant, the evidence must to your 
minds exclude every reasonable hypo-
thesis other than that of the guilt of 
the defendant. That is to say, if 
after an entire consideration and com-
parison of all the testimony in the 
case you can reasonably explain the 
facts given in evidence on any reason-
able ground other than the guilt of 
the defendant, you should acquit him. 
(R. 52,53) 
This court explained the rationale behind such 
jury instructions in State v. Garcia, 11 Utah 2d 67, 355 
P.2d 57 (1960), where it stated: 
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[We) have held that where the only 
proof of material fact or one 
which is a necessary element of 
defendant's guilt consists of cir-
cumstantial evidence, such circum-
stances must reasonably preclude 
every hypothesis of defendant's 
innocence. An instruction to this 
effect in an appropriate situation 
would be proper but this requires 
care to use language which the jury 
would understand and which would not 
merely lend to their confusion. 
We must keep in mind that this 
rule is applicable only where proof 
of a.material ~ssue ~s based solely 
on circumstantial evidence. 
355 P.2d at 59-60. (Emphasis added.) 
See also State v. Bender, 581 P.2d 1019 (Utah 1978); State v. 
Fort, 572 P.2d 1387 (Utah 1977). 
The rule requiring a reasonable alternative hypothesis 
instruction is clearly inapplicable to a case such as the 
present where both direct and circumstantial evidence 
establishing appellant's guilt was presented. In this case, 
two eyewitness accounts of the events leading up to the death 
of Joe Boykin were submitted to the jury. This testimony 
established appellant's role in causing Boykin's death and 
also constituted direct evidence from which other elements 
of the crime, such as intent, could be inferred. State v. 
~. 554 P. 2d 216, 219 (Utah 1976). 
Appellant contends that it was error to deny.his 
request for an instruction on reasonable alternative hypothesis, 
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claiming that the evidence of intent in the present case 
was wholly circumstantial and subject to alternative con-
clusions. Appellant further contends that there is a 
danger that in the absence of such an instruction the jury 
would not understand that if there were another explanation 
for defendant's conduct giving rise to a reasonable doubt 
as to his guilt, he should be acquitted. 
Respondent contends that is was not error to deny 
the requested instruction. It is well established that inte:: 
can generally be presumed from other evidence produced at tr.: 
I 
trial. This court recognized the value of making reason~k 1 
inferences from proven facts in State v. Peterson, 22 Utah 1: 
377, 453 P. 2d 696 (1969). The defendant in that case was 
convicted of assault with a deadly weapon with the inte~tt 
do bodily harm. On appeal, defendant contended the intent t: 
do bodily harm was not sufficiently established by the proV€: 1 
fact that defendant made a slashing motion toward his victi: 
with a hunting knife, injuring the victim's hand. This c~r 
affirmed the conviction, stating: 
It is true that the State was unable to 
prove directly what was in the defen?an~'s 
mind relative to doing harm to the victim; 
and that he in fact denied having any such 
intent. However, this version does not 
establish the fact, nor does it even nec-
essarily raise sufficient doubt to initiate 
the conviction. If it were so, it would 
lie within the power of a defendant to 
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defeat practically any conviction which 
dep~nded upon his state of mind. As 
ag~i~st what he says, it is the jury's 
privilege to weigh and consider all of 
the other facts and circumstances shown 
in ~vidence ~n determining what they will 
believe. This includes not only what was 
said and what was done, but also the con-
duct shown, which in this instance they 
may well have regarded as speaking louder 
than the defendant's later defensive 
claims as to what his intentions were. 
22 Utah 2d at 378, 453 P.2d at 697. 
Appellant's contention that an instruction on 
reasonable alternative hypothesis was necessary because 
appellant's intent was established by reasonable inferences 
based upon facts shown by direct evidence is totally without 
merit. This Court treated a similar situation in State v. 
Hopkins, 11 Utah 2d 363, 359 P.2d 486 (1961). In Hopkins, 
the defendant was convicted of Second Degree Burglary 
involving the entry of a second story apartment. The evidence 
of defendant's guilt included the fact that he matched a 
witnesses' description of one of two men she saw climbing a 
ladder outside the window, and the fact that one defendant's 
shoes and his car were found in the vicinity. The defendant 
at first denied entering the apartment, then admitted that he 
had been present. However, the defendant claimed he had 
picked up a stranger, had driven him home for $2.00 gas money, 
and later helped him enter the apartment. The defendant 
argued that since there was no direct proof that he entered 
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with the intent to commit larceny, he was entitled to 
acquittal under the rule that where circumstantial evidence 
is relied upon to establish guilt, the evidence must exc~~ 
every other reasonable hypothesis. This Court affirmed the 
conviction, stating: 
The difficulty with defendant's position 
is that the rule he relies on is not 
applicable where . . • there is dispute 
in the evidence and one version thereof 
does not support his thesis. He errs in 
assuming that the jury was obliged to 
believe his story as to what happened 
and why he entered the apartment. The 
fact that after being caught in the cross-
fire of his wife's identification of the 
shoes, he admitted that he had falsified 
about them and about being in the apartment, 
and made an explanation which seemed 
reasonable to him, and inconsistent with 
his guilt, does not mean that the jury 
had to so believe. It was their exclusive 
prerogative to judge the credit to be 
given the evidence and to determine the 
facts. 
It is to be remembered that intent, being 
a state of mind, is rarely susceptible of 
direct proof, but it can be inferred from 
conduct and attendant circumstances in the 
light of human behavior and experience. 
359 P.2d at 487. 
In the present case the testimony of two eye-witne' 
provided ample direct evidence of appellant's actions from 
which the requisite intent to support the jury's verdictof 
· f d Appellant, on the other ha~ .. Manslaughter could be in erre . 
contends that the evidence was also susceptible of the altC 
hypothesis that appellant was acting in self-defense, as 
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discussed under the preceding two points, evidence tending 
to support the appellant's theory of self-defense was pre-
sented at trial and the jury was adequately instructed in 
the law applicable to a claim of self-defense, making an 
instruction on reasonable alternative hypothesis unnecessary. 
It was the jury's prerogative to reach its con-
clusions based upon the evidence adduced at trial. Accordingly, 
the jury concluded that appellant was not justified in using 
deadly force against Boykin. This conclusion is supported 
by appellant's own testimony which showed he did not act in 
the reasonable belief that deadly force was necessary to 
protect himself or another from serious deadly harm. Appellant 
admitted that Boykin did not threaten him verbally or through 
gestures (R. 344-345); that although Boykin had his hand 
in his pocket, appellant did not see any bulge in the pocket 
(R. 333) and that appellant wondered before the shooting why 
Boykin had not removed the suspected weapon from his pocket 
(R. 340). Thus, direct evidence from the appellant's testimony 
showed that he did not act under a reasonable belief of 
imminent danger and, accordingly, he was not entitled to his 
claimed defense of self-defense. 
Appellant further contends that failure to give the 
requested instruction could result in confusion as to the 
State's burden of proof. Appellant claims that without 
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instruction on reasonable alternative hypothesis, the jur 
could conclude that appellant had the burden of proof of 
establishing his defense beyond a reasonable doubt. Cons: 
ering the jury instructions actually given, there is no 
possibility that the jury could have misunderstood the ~t 
burden of proof. The jury was instructed upon the prosecu: 
burden where a defendant pleads not guilty (instruction nu:. 
3, R. 7 6) , the presumption of innocence (instruction numbe~ 
R. 8 5) and the need to find guilt beyond a reasonable dout: 
as related to the specific crimes of Second Degree Murder 
(instruction number 15, R. 87) and Manslaughter ( instructic 
number 17, R. 90). In addition, jury instruction numberl: 
specifically applied the reasonable doubt standard to self· 
defense. This instruction read: 
(R. 95) 
You are instructed that the laws of Utah 
do not require a defendant to establish 
self-defense by a preponderance or greater 
weight of the evidence. The laws of Utah 
require the defendant to bring forward 
some substantial evidence which tends to 
show self-defense. If the defendant has 
done this, and if such evidence of self-
defense when considered in connection with 
all other evidence in this case raises a 
reasonable doubt as to the defendant's 
guilt or if it raises a reasonable doubt 
as to whether or not the defendant acted 
in self-defense you must acquit him of 
the charges . 
The effect of this instruction would be to a~~ 
confusion as to the burden of proof applicable in the pre" 
-26-Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
case. Furthermore, this Court observed in its recent 
decision in State v. Eagle, No 16189 (Utah Sup.Ct. filed 
May 6, 1980), that "the reasonable alternative hypo~hesis 
instruction is merely one way of expressing [the) necessary 
burden of proof and there is no apparent reason to mandate 
that one, and only one, particular instruction be used .. 
in conveying to the jury the meaning of ... 'proof beyond 
a reasonable doubt.'" 
In the present case, the jury was clearly and 
adequately informed of the legal standards to be applied to 
appellant's claim of self-defense and the relative burdens 
placed upon the State and appellant. Accordingly, the trial 
court committed no error in refusing appellant's requested 
instruction on reasonable alternative hypothesis. 
POINT IV 
THERE IS NO CUMULATIVE EFFECT OF 
ERRORS JUSTIFYING A REVERSAL IN 
THE INSTANT CASE. 
The doctrine announced in State v. St. Clair, 3 
Utah 2d 230, 282 P.2d 323 (1955), that in some instances 
errors, which when standing alone would not justify reversal, 
may have such a cumulative effect so as to deprive the accused 
of a fair trial, is not disputed by respondent. However, 
respondent submits that the instant case does not meet the 
cciteria set forth in State v. St. Clair, supra. The duty of 
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the appellant is set forth at 3 Utah 2d 244: 
[I)f the court can say with assurance 
that the evidence of the defendants' 
guilt was so clear and convincing that 
no reasonable jury could be expected to 
return a different verdict, even in the 
absence of the irregularities, then the 
errors would be harmless and the verdict 
should be permitted to stand. On the 
other hand, if there is reasonable 
likelihood that in the absence of the 
errors a different verdict might have 
been rendered, a new trial should be 
granted. (Emphasis added.) 
In the instant case there is no cumulation of em 
which would justify a conclusion that a different verdict 
would have been reached by the jury in the absence of such 
errors. In State v. St. Clair, supra, the cumulation of er: 
supported this court's finding that it was reasonably like!: 
the verdict of the jury would have been different but for f 
errors. However, the alleged errors in the instant case do 
not justify such a conclusion. 
To conclude that a cumulation of errors has prec! 
appellant from having a fair trial first necessitates a c~ 
clusion that errors were committed. Respondent submits tha: 
no errors were committed by the trial court in the present 
case, and therefore, State v. St. Clair, supra, is clearly 
distinguishable 
Respondent submits that this court should foll~ 
State v. Sinclair, 15 Utah 2d 162, 389 P.2d 465 (1964), 
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wherein it is stated at 15 Utah 2d 170: 
Under our statute [Utah Code Ann. 
§ 77-42-1 (1953)), which requires that 
errors which do not affect the essential 
rights of the parties be disregarded, we 
cann~t properly interfere with the jury's 
verdict, unless upon a review of the whole 
case it should appear that there was error 
o~ sufficient gravity that the defendant's 
rights were prejudiced in some substantial 
way. We have found nothing of any such 
consequence here. (Emphasis added.) 
Respondent submits that a review of the whole record 
requires a conclusion that the appellant received a fair trial 
and that no error was committed that prejudiced appellant in 
a substantial way. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court did not commit error in instructing 
the jury in the statutory definition of self-defense where 
the instruction was supported by a reasonable interpretation 
of the evidence. The court also correctly refused to give to 
the jury appellant's requested instruction concerning past 
violent acts of the deceased since the instructions actually 
given allowed the jury to consider these facts. 
Finally, the appellant was not entitled to an 
instruction on reasonable alternative hypothesis where there 
was sufficient direct evidence establishing his guilt and 
forming the basis for reasonable inferences from his actions. 
Based upon this argument and the foregoing citation 
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of authority, respondent respectfully urges this Court 
to affirm the judgment and sentence of the court below. 
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